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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 This case comes to us on appeal from the District Court’s order granting 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim.  
The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal antitrust causes of action for failure to 
adequately plead antitrust standing and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Plaintiff’s state law claims.1
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, as well as 
15 U.S.C. § 15.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  We will affirm. 
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I.  Background2
 Plaintiff, SigmaPharm, Inc., is a Delaware corporation that develops 
pharmaceutical technologies and products, and enters into agreements with other entities 
to commercialize them.  Defendants Mutual Pharmaceuticals Company, Inc. and United 
Research Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, “Mutual”) are Pennsylvania corporations that 
develop, manufacture, market, sell, and distribute pharmaceutical drugs.  Defendant King 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“King”) is a Tennessee corporation that develops, manufactures, 
markets, sells, and distributes pharmaceutical drugs.     
 
 In March 1999, SigmaPharm and Mutual entered into a “development agreement,” 
pursuant to which SigmaPharm granted Mutual certain rights in future “innovations” 
developed by SigmaPharm in exchange for payments from Mutual.  “Innovations” are 
inventions, improvements, or enhancements to Mutual’s pharmaceutical products 
developed by SigmaPharm for which Mutual secures a patent or which Mutual otherwise 
deems to be an “innovation.”  (App. 121.)  The development agreement states that 
Mutual “shall be the sole and exclusive owner of all right, title and interest in and to the 
Innovations in the United States market.”  (App. 73, 122.)  Likewise, it states that 
SigmaPharm “shall remain the sole and exclusive owner of all right, title and interest in 
and to the Innovations in all markets other than the United States market.”  (App. 73, 
122.)   
                                              
2 As we write primarily for the parties, we discuss only those facts necessary for our 
disposition of this appeal.  We borrow heavily from the District Court’s recitation of the 
facts. 
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For generic equivalents of name-brand drugs developed by SigmaPharm that 
required approval under the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (“ANDA”) process, SigmaPharm was to receive 20% of the gross 
profits from Mutual’s U.S. sales.  But if additional generic competitors entered the 
market, the royalties would decrease based on the number of competitors.  The 
development agreement further provided that if Mutual licensed or sold the right to sell a 
product incorporating a SigmaPharm “innovation,” or “agree[d] to refrain from selling 
such product,” SigmaPharm was to receive 25% of the gross profit from the licensing 
fees or royalties from that license, sale, or agreement.  (App. 74, 123.)   
 Pursuant to the development agreement, SigmaPharm developed a generic 
equivalent of the brand-name muscle relaxant SKELAXIN, which is owned and marketed 
by King.3
 In March 2004, King brought a patent infringement lawsuit against Mutual in the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and petitioned the FDA to require 
  SKELAXIN’s active ingredient, metaxalone, is no longer protected by patent.  
In March 2003, Mutual filed an ANDA for this SigmaPharm-developed generic product, 
including a certification that one of King’s patents did not claim a use for which Mutual 
was seeking approval.  In January 2004, after King received another method patent 
related to SKELAXIN, Mutual filed a certification with the FDA that its generic product 
would not infringe that patent.     
                                              
3 This was, in fact, the second generic SKELAXIN product that SigmaPharm had 
developed.  The relevant product for this appeal is the second product SigmaPharm 
developed, so we will not discuss the first generic product. 
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that those seeking to market a generic version of SKELAXIN include information on the 
generic product’s label that implicated King’s method patents.  King also asked the FDA 
to stay approval of any ANDAs for generic competitors to SKELAXIN until it had 
decided the petition.  Mutual opposed each of these requests in multiple filings with the 
FDA between April 2004 and February 2005.   
 King and Mutual’s adversarial behavior seemed to end on December 6, 2005, 
when King agreed to pay tens of millions of dollars for co-exclusive licensing rights for 
one of Mutual’s metaxalone-related patents.  Two days later, Mutual withdrew its 
opposition to King’s petition for labeling requirements for generic SKELAXIN, even 
though that petition would have threatened Mutual’s ability to market its generic product 
without infringing certain of King’s patents.  Then, in 2007, when King made a 
supplemental submission to the FDA in support of its petition and request for a stay of 
approval of any generic SKELAXIN ANDAs, Mutual submitted comments in support of 
King.     
Meanwhile, following a joint filing under seal on May 15, 2006, an indefinite stay 
of the proceedings was issued in the patent case between Mutual and King.  Despite the 
fact that another district court had found the relevant patents to be invalid in January 
2009, see King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 501, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 
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2009), Mutual did not inform the district court handling its patent litigation with King of 
this development until August 2010, in a court-ordered status report.4
 Based on these facts, SigmaPharm’s amended complaint alleges that, sometime 
between February 2005 and December 2005, Mutual and King entered into an agreement 
“to restrict the output of, and thereby to raise the price of, pharmaceutical products that 
are bioequivalent to” SKELAXIN.  (App. 82.)  SigmaPharm claims this agreement was a 
horizontal restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Count I), 
Pennsylvania common law barring restraint of trade (Count II), and California statutes 
barring unlawful and unfair competition (Count III).  The amended complaint also asserts 
that Mutual breached its contract with SigmaPharm by failing to pay SigmaPharm 25% 
of the revenues it received from King pursuant to the allegedly unlawful agreement 
(Count IV).  SigmaPharm’s amended complaint sought injunctive and monetary relief, 
including treble damages under the federal antitrust laws. 
   
 The defendants moved to dismiss Counts I through III of the amended complaint  
because, inter alia, SigmaPharm’s pleadings failed adequately to allege antitrust injury, a 
necessary component of so-called “antitrust standing.”  In a thorough and thoughtful 
opinion, the District Court found that SigmaPharm had failed adequately to plead 
antitrust injury, dismissed Count I of the amended complaint without prejudice, and 
                                              
4 The Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of the District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York that the patents at issue in the King-Mutual dispute were invalid.  King 
Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267 (Fed Cir. 2010).   
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declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.  
SigmaPharm did not seek to amend its complaint, but instead filed the instant appeal.   
II. Discussion5
  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), plaintiffs suing under the federal antitrust laws have been 
required to show that, in addition to the prerequisites of constitutional standing, see Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), they possess so-called “antitrust standing.”  
Mere injury resulting from conduct that violated the antitrust laws is insufficient to confer 
antitrust standing.  Instead, a plaintiff can only recover under the federal antitrust laws if 
its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and . . . flows from 
that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”  Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489; see also 
Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d 
Cir. 1987).   
 
The Supreme Court has articulated a number of factors to consider in determining 
whether a plaintiff has antitrust standing: 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to the 
plaintiff and the intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with neither 
factor alone conferring standing; (2) whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is 
of the type for which the antitrust laws were intended to provide redress; 
(3) the directness of the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might produce speculative claims; (4) the 
existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and (5) 
the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of 
damages. 
                                              
5 The District Court thoroughly discussed the relevant law in this area, and we again 
borrow heavily from Judge Rufe’s well-reasoned opinion.   
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In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165–66 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 545 (1983)).  The second factor, antitrust injury, is a necessary (though 
insufficient) condition of antitrust standing.  Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 
479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986); Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1166.  “As a general matter, 
the class of plaintiffs capable of satisfying the antitrust-injury requirement is limited to 
consumers and competitors in the restrained market and to those whose injuries are the 
means by which the defendants seek to achieve their anticompetitive ends.”  W. Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).   
The District Court was correct to note that SigmaPharm is neither a consumer nor 
a competitor in the United States market for products that are bioequivalent to 
SKELAXIN.  SigmaPharm does not allege that it marketed or manufactured a generic 
version of SKELAXIN, nor could it under its development agreement with Mutual.  See 
App. 73, 122 (“[Mutual] shall be the sole and exclusive owner of all right, title and 
interest in and to the Innovations in the United States market.”); Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Because it is undisputed 
that B&P never ‘sold’ or ‘distributed’ or sought to sell or distribute any vaccine to 
anyone, however, it is plain that B&P was not a competitor in the market for sales of the 
vaccine.”).  Its allegation that it is a “participant” in the market for SKELAXIN-
equivalent products “[t]hrough its Development Agreement with Mutual” (App. 87) is 
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insufficient as a matter of law to establish that it is a competitor in the relevant market.  
Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182-83.   
In Barton & Pittinos, we held that a plaintiff, B&P, was not a competitor of the 
defendant for antitrust standing purposes because what the plaintiff provided to the 
market was not “reasonably interchangeable” with what was offered by those in the 
relevant market.  Id. at 182.  This was because B&P, a provider of marketing services, 
did not actually sell the product whose market was allegedly restrained: a vaccine.  Id. at 
179-80, 182-83.  Instead, B&P participated in a “program” in which the vaccine-maker 
paid B&P to market the vaccine to, and solicit orders from, nursing homes and then pass 
those orders on to a third-party, which would buy the vaccine from the manufacturer and 
sell it to the nursing homes.  Id.  We held as a matter of law that B&P’s reliance on the 
third-party to participate in the vaccine-market rendered it not a competitor in that market 
for purposes of antitrust standing.  Id. at 182-83.   
Like B&P, SigmaPharm was not providing a product or service that was 
“reasonably interchangeable” with an existing product or service in the relevant market—
here, the market for SKELAXIN-equivalent products.  See id. at 182.  Its reliance on a 
third-party—viz. Mutual—to sell the product in the relevant market, like B&P’s, renders 
SigmaPharm a non-competitor in the relevant market for purposes of antitrust standing. 
Although not a competitor in the market for SKELAXIN-equivalent products, 
SigmaPharm provided an input into what could have been Mutual’s entrée into that 
market.  This input—the formulation for a drug that is bioequivalent to SKELAXIN—is 
certainly a crucial one, but this does not transform SigmaPharm into a competitor in that 
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market for purposes of our antitrust-standing analysis.  See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech 
Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding supplier of active 
ingredient for drug lacked antitrust standing to allege anticompetitive agreement to 
apportion market for the drug).  Consumers in the market could not have “abandoned 
[King] in favor of [SigmaPharm] alone.  Doing so would [leave] [such consumers] 
without the most important part of the package of goods and services [that could have 
been] offered by [SigmaPharm and Mutual] together:  the [SKELAXIN-equivalent 
product] itself.”  See Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182-83.6
The District Court was also correct in finding that SigmaPharm did not adequately 
plead that its injuries were “the means by which the defendants [sought] to achieve their 
anticompetitive ends.”  W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 102; see Blue Shield 
of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 (1982).  In McCready, the case that established 
this way of showing antitrust injury, the Supreme Court held that a health insurance 
subscriber had antitrust standing to bring a claim that her insurer conspired with 
psychiatrists to restrain competition in the market for psychotherapeutic services by 
  Therefore, we agree with 
the District Court that SigmaPharm was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the 
relevant market. 
                                              
6 It is true that SigmaPharm’s circumstances are different from B&P’s in that 
SigmaPharm alleges that the very third-party on which it would rely to become a 
“participant” in the relevant market—Mutual—was part of the allegedly unlawful 
agreement.  Under Barton & Pittinos, however, this does not appear relevant in the 
determination of whether SigmaPharm itself is a competitor in the relevant market.   
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providing insurance coverage only for visits to psychiatrists, not psychologists.  Id.  The 
McCready Court stated: 
Denying reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment was the 
very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to achieve its 
illegal ends.  The harm to McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; 
indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal 
conspiracy.  Where the injury alleged is so integral an aspect of the 
conspiracy alleged, there can be no question but that the loss was precisely 
“the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.” 
 
Id. at 479 (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).  Here, defendants could have effectuated 
their conspiracy even if SigmaPharm did not exist.  See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting union 
health funds’ argument that they had antitrust standing under McCready to sue tobacco 
companies for alleged conspiracy to hide dangers of smoking because tobacco companies 
could have achieved their alleged aims without the existence of the health funds).  
Therefore, SigmaPharm’s injuries were not the means by which the defendants sought to 
achieve their allegedly illegal ends, and SigmaPharm therefore has not adequately pled 
antitrust injury under McCready.7
                                              
7 We express no opinion as to whether a plaintiff that manufactures a product, but uses a 
third-party to sell that product to consumers, suffers antitrust injury when the market for 
that product is unlawfully restrained.  See Ethylpharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 598 F. 
Supp. 2d 611 (D. Del. 2009) (holding that foreign drug manufacturer that used U.S. 
licensee to market and distribute its drug had alleged antitrust injury based on restraint of 
drug sales in the U.S.); Chemi SpA v. GlaxoSmithKline, 356 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (denying judgment on pleadings based on antitrust standing where foreign drug 
manufacturer sold its drug to U.S. companies for resale in the U.S.).  As the District 
Court noted, SigmaPharm does not claim that it manufactures any pharmaceuticals in the 
United States, and it expressly disclaimed any right to do so in its development 
agreement with Mutual.   
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Undoubtedly, SigmaPharm alleges that it was injured by the claimed 
anticompetitive agreement because it did not receive royalties.  This, however, does not 
mean that they have pled antitrust injury, even if the alleged anticompetitive conduct is a 
per se violation of the antitrust laws.  See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 
495 U.S. 328, 335 (1990); Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., Inc., 213 F.3d 118, 
120 (3d Cir. 2000) (“To state a claim for damages under [15 U.S.C. § 15], a plaintiff must 
allege . . . antitrust injury . . . even where . . . the alleged acts of the defendants constitute 
a per se violation of the antitrust laws.”); see also Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.  
Ultimately, the question comes down to whether the injury alleged is of the type that the 
antitrust statute was intended to forestall.  Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 459 
U.S. at 540 (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487-88).  We conclude, based on our 
precedent, that Congress, in enacting the federal antitrust laws, did not intend to prevent 
losses like those SigmaPharm alleges:  loss of a contractually agreed upon profit-share in 
a product manufactured and sold by a market-participant.  SigmaPharm may have 
avenues of recovery, but the federal antitrust laws are not among them.8
Finally, SigmaPharm argues that the District Court erred by not telling it that it 
had leave to amend its complaint and not telling it that curative amendments to its 
complaint would be inequitable or futile.  We have held that a dismissal without 
 
                                              
8 Although the District Court recognized that its determination that SigmaPharm did not 
suffer antitrust injury was sufficient to conclude that SigmaPharm lacked antitrust 
standing, it nevertheless examined another factor in the antitrust standing analysis:  
whether there are more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violation.  Concluding as we 
do that the District Court correctly found that SigmaPharm failed to plead antitrust injury, 
we need not and do not address any other factor in the antitrust standing analysis. 
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prejudice will be treated as a final order if the plaintiff has elected to “stand upon the 
original complaint” by not offering or seeking to amend the complaint and instead filing a 
notice of appeal and arguing that the allegations in the complaint were legally sufficient.  
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2007).  This is exactly the 
situation we face here.  Although SigmaPharm requests, in the alternative, an opportunity 
to attempt to cure its pleading deficiencies, it presents no basis upon which to amend its 
complaint adequately to allege antitrust injury. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
SigmaPharm’s amended complaint in its entirety. 
